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This paper examines theoreticaUy the effects of more
stringent capital regulation on bank asset portfolio risk.
The analysis shows that, for a value-maximizing bank,
incentives to increase asset risk decline as its capital
increases. Thus, as long as regulatory efforts to contain
asset risk andsize are not reduced, more stringent capital
regulation unambiguouslyreduces the expectedliability of
the deposit insurance system.
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Concern over the risk exposure of the federal deposit
insurance system has been a major factor behind the
increase in capital standards in banking in the 1980s. A
central issue in bank capital regulation is whether the
enforcement of higher capital ratio requirements gives
banks greater incentive to increase asset risk, thereby
partially or even fully offsetting the effect of a higher
capital ratio on defaultrisk. Indeed a majorcriticismofthe
regulatory attempts to raise bankcapitalratios in the 1980s
is that these efforts "drove" banks to seek out more risky
activities. This view that more stringent capital regulation
will exacerbate the problem of risk-taking appears to be
held widely among commercial bankers and is evident in
the financial press as well as in the academic literature. 1
In this note, we address the question of how more
stringent capital ratio requirements affect the incentives of
a fully insured bank to increase the riskiness of its asset
portfolio. The analysis builds on that of studies such as
Sharpe (1978), Kareken and Wallace (1978), and Dothan
and Williams (1980), which use state-preference models to
examine the effects ofdeposit insurance, and those such as
Merton (1977) and Pyle (1984), which model the deposit
insurance guarantee as a put option. These studies show
that, for a value-maximizing bank with subsidized deposit
insurance, regulations are required to control both leverage
and asset risk. What is not addressed fully is how a bank's
incentives for increasing asset risk vary with changes in
capital ratio requirements. It is importantto fill this gap in
orderto assess the effectofbankcapitalregulationonbank
default risk and the risk exposure ofthe deposit insurance
system.
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and
is summarized as Y(YI' Yz). Security X is the riskier
security such that Xl < YI and Xz > Yz. The current prices
of Securities X and Yare:
respectively. Without loss ofgenerality, the payouts ineach
state are defined to be such that the price ofa unit ofeach
security is the same, that is,
(3)
(2)
(4) P x = Py = PD = P.
The equalities in (4), along with the assumption that
Security X is riskier than Security Y, imply that Xl < YI <
1 < Yz < Xz·
Theshareofa bank's assets allocated to the riskierasset,
Security X, is S, and the share allocated to Security Y is
(l - S).
(1) PD = PI + Pz·
Deposits then earn the risk-free real rate, lI(P I + Pz) - 1.
A bank can invest in two risky assets, Security X and
Security Y. One unit ofSecurityX represents a promise by
the issuerto pay Xl dollars ifState 1occurs andXzdollars if
State 2 occurs, and is summarized asX(xI' Xz). SecurityY
In this section, a state-preference model is used to
analyze the portfolio and leverage decisions ofan insured
bank that maximizes its current value (the market value of
its equity). We use a two-period model with two possible
future states. The current prices of a dollar payout in the
future states are PI and Pz, for State 1 and State 2,
respectively. These prices are taken as given and are
unaffected by the portfolio decisions ofbanks.
To fund its current assets, Ao, a bank has an initial
amount ofcapital, Co, and issues insured deposits, Do, so
thatAo = Do + Co' zA unit ofdeposits pays off$1 in each
state and is summarized as D(I,I). The current price of a
unit ofdeposits is:
In (6), (Co + Do)/P is the number of units of asset
securities held and PI [SXI + (l - S)YI] is the current
value of the asset payoff in State 1 per unit of security.
(DolP)P I is the current value ofdepositors' claims in State
1. For deposit insurance to have a value to the bank, the
value ofthe bank's assets in State 1has to fall short ofthe
claims of depositors. The current value ofthat short-fall,
whichcorrespondsto the optionvalueofdepositinsurance,
is equal to the current value ofthe payout to depositors by
the insurance fund in the bankruptcy state. Given Co, a
bank seeking to maximize the current value of its equity,
which is Vo = Co + /0' will try to maximize the value of
the deposit insurance option, /0'
Co+Do
Vo = P [Sx I + (l - S)ydPI
Co+Do + P [Sxz + (l - S)Yz]Pz - Do·
(5) simplifies to Vo = Co' That is, the value ofa bank that
canmeetits obligations to depositors in both states is equal
to its initial capital; there is no deposit insurance subsidy.
However, a bank that can fail-that is, one that cannot
meet its obligations to depositors in one state-benefits
from deposit insurance. Given that the initial capital posi-
tion and assetriskofa bankis suchthatbankruptcy occurs
II. Value ofDeposit Insurance
For a bank that is capitalized such that it can meet its in State 1, and the deposit insurance premiumrate is zero,3
obligations to depositors in all future states, deposit insur- the currentvalue ofthe depositinsurance subsidy, 10 , from
ance is redundant, and, thus, has no value. The current (5) is
value, Vo, of a bank that can meet its obligations to C D
Do 0+ 0
depositors in both State 1andState 2 equals the sumofthe (6) /0 = P PI - P PI [SXI + (l - S)YI] > O.
current value ofthe payoffs on assets in each oftwo states
minus the current value ofdepositors' claims:
(5)
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(8)
It is well known that a bank can maximize 10 by
maintaining the highest degree ofleverage (the lowest ratio
ofinitial capital to initial assets) allowed by regulation and
by increasing asset portfolio risk as much as possible.
Underthe traditionally invoked assumption that Co is fixed
(an assumption that will be dropped shortly) the effect ofa
change in leverage (a change in DolAo) on the value ofthe
insurance guarantee is obtained by differentiating (6) with
respect to Do. Doing so yields
alo I PI
(7) aD Co = p {I - [Sx 1 + (l - S)YI]) > O.
o
The partial derivative is positive since, as stated above,
Xl < YI < 1, which means that [SxI + (1 - S)Yd < 1.
Thus, the current value of the deposit insurance subsidy
increases with leverage. With subsidized deposit insur-
ance, a value-maximizing bank would limit its leverage
only ifforced to do so by regulation.
Constraints on bank asset risk also are required. In this
model, increased asset risk is associated with a higher
value ofS. The effect of a change in risk-taking on 10 , as
determined from (6), is
alo PI
as = - AoP (x I - YI) > O.
The partial derivative is positive since Xl < YI' The
positive relation between asset risk and the value of the
deposit insurance guarantee indicates that a value-max-
imizing bank with underpriced deposit insurance would
want to have S = 1. To prevent this, regulators would have
to control asset risk, which in this model could mean
limiting S to some maximum S or imposing regulatory
costs that are a positive function ofS. For a bank to be at
S < 1, regulatory cost would have to be such that the
marginal cost ofexceeding that particularvalue ofS was at
least equal to the marginal value (in terms of increased
value ofdeposit insurance) from doing so.
This condition for asset risk regulation to be effective is
precisely the reason that the question of how capital
regulation affects the incentives for increasing asset risk is
important. Those who maintain that capital regulation
leads to more asset risk implicitly argue that the marginal
value from increasing asset risk is negatively related to
changes in leverage (Le., positively related to changes in
the capital-to-asset ratio). This position implies that for
higher capital standards to be fully effective they likely
would have to be accompanied bythe imposition ofhigher
regulatory costs for violating asset-risk constraints. Onthe
otherhand, ifthe marginal value iseithernotrelatedtooris
positively related to changes in leverage, the enforcement
ofhigher capital standards would not lead to greater asset
risk, unless the restrictions on asset risk themselves were
relaxed.
(8) indicates that the gain from increasing asset risk
depends on asset size but not on the bank's leverage per se.
Under the assumption of fixed capital, however, a change
in leverage directly affects the volume ofassets. A reduc-
tion in leverage can only be accomplished by selling assets
and using the proceeds to retire liabilities. From (8), the
marginal gain from increasing asset risk is positively
related to a change in leverage. That is,
a
210 I PI
(9) aSaD
o
Co = -p (Xl - YI) > O.
This means that a reduction in leverage achieved via
retiring debt and shrinking assets would reduce the margi-
nal gain from increasing asset risk. In other words, a bank
would not be expected to respond to higher capital require-
ments by increasing the riskiness ofits asset portfolio.
IV. Allowing Capital to Vary
While the assumption of fixed capital may be suitable
for certain banks, it is not appropriate for many larger
banking organizations with access to capital markets. The
ability of a bank to issue new capital is a potentially
important consideration since, as we show below, a bank
would prefer to do so when it reduces leverage in response
to more stringent capital requirements. The reason for this
preference is that, for a given degree ofleverage, the total
value ofthe insurance subsidy, 10 , is positively related to
the volume of assets, holding leverage constant. This can
be seen from the derivative of the value of the insurance
36
guarantee, in (6), with respect to assets, holding leverage
constant, which is
(10)
The term in the braces is the expression for the value ofthe
deposit insurance, which is positive given the bankruptcy
conditions for State 1.
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would receive a larger insurance subsidy by increasing Co
than by selling assets and reducing deposits. This is
relevant to the analysis since the extent to which a bank
alters its leverage by issuing new equity affects the volume
ofassets, which from (6) determines how the gains from
increasing asset risk are affected. As we show next,
however, allowing capital to vary does not change the
earlier conclusion from (9) regarding the effects of lever-
ageon the changein the value ofthe insurancesubsidy with
respect to changes in asset risk. The reason is that, even
when a bankcan increase Co, requiring the bank to reduce
leverage will result either in a net contraction in Aoor no
change in Ao.
To see why initial assets would not expand, first note
that from (10) a bank, as well as the banking industry as a
whole, will expand as Aomuch as possible, independent of
any requirement to reduce leverage. Specifically, a bank
would have expanded assets to the point where the margi-
nal gain from increasing assets was balanced by the
marginal cost ofdoing so. The main source ofsuch a cost
would be regulatory constraints.
Next, assuming no change in the marginal cost of
increasing assets when leverage is reduced (that is, regula-
tory restrictions are not relaxed), a bank would expand
assets only if the change in the value of the insurance
subsidy with respect to assets declines as leverage in-
creases. However, from (10) the opposite is the case-that
is: [a2Io/aA a(Do/Ao)) > O. Therefore, a bank would not
hold more assets when required to reduce leverage, even if
the bank can increase Co.
Given this result, the effectofleverage onthe gains from
increasing asset risk for a bank that can issue new capital
(increase Co) are similar to those for a bank with fixed
initial capital. That is, from (8),
a2Io aAo PI
(ll) aSAa(Do/Ao) a(Do/Ao) P (Xl -YI) > 0,
given that [aAo/a(Do/Ao)) > 0, which holds if Ao con-
tracts when a bank is required to reduce leverage. In the
limiting case in which Aois unchanged, the partial deriva-
tive in (11) is equal to zero. Therefore, the incentives for a
bank to increase asset risk do not rise as leverage falls.
Theconclusionwe draw from the state-preference model
is that, ifthe costs to a bank from expanding asset risk and
size are not reduced due to a relaxation of regulatory
constraints, a value-maximizing bank, whether or not it
can issue new capital, will not respond to more stringent
capital requirements by increasing the riskiness of its
assets. Thus, more stringent capital regulation unam-
biguously reduces the risk exposure of the deposit insur-
ance system.
F( ) is the standard normal cumulative density function.
Assuming that capital is fixed, the familiar results
regarding the effects ofleverage and asset risk on the value
ofdeposit insurance, the put option, can be derived from
(12) as follows:
the value ofthe option.
the current value of insured deposits, which are
assumed to constitute all deposits.
the current value ofassets (excluding the value of
the insurance option).
the standard deviation of the rate of return on
assets, which is the measure ofrisk.
the interval to the next examination.
where:
10
Do =
Ao
a
t =
X
V. Options Model
Options models also have been used to analyze the
effects of leverage and asset risk on the equity value of a
bank when deposit insurance is mispriced. One advantage
of options models is that they are more general than the
two-state model presented above. However, as with the
studies using state-preference models, the studies model-
ing deposit insurance as a put option do not address fully
the question of how capital regulation affects the gains
from increasing asset risk nor do they discuss why this
issue is important. In this section, we show that an options
model yields conclusions similar to those derived from the
state-preference model concerning the implications of
capital regulation for asset risk among value-maximizing
banks.
FollowingMerton (1977), the Black-Scholesformula for
a European put option can be adapted to apply to the
federal deposit insurance guarantee. Assuming all earn-
ings are retained and a zero insurance premium, the
current value ofthe insurance guarantee is
(12) 10 = DoF(a-vt- X) - AoF(-X)
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aIo I
(Do/Ao) > O. aAo
However, regulatory costs thatare sufficientto limitAoata
given level ofleverage will be sufficient at any lower level
ofleverage since
holds for a bank that can increase Co in order to reduce
leverage. Again, under the options model, a bank would
expand assets, holding leverage constant, as much as
possible, independent ofany required change inleverage,
since from (12)
a 2Io ----=---- > o.
aAoa(Do/Ao)
Therefore, a reduction in leverage will not lead to an
increase in Ao, everything else equal.
With an increase in Ao ruled out, it follows from (14)
thattheeffectofleverage onthe gainsfromincreasing asset
risk is
... r:-" ax
Aov t F (X) aD
o
aJ
-..2 = AoYfF'(X) > 0
aer
aIo ... r:- -Ic =F(ervt -X)-F(-X»O
aDo 0
and
(13)
(14)
(15)
whereF'( ) is the standardnormal density function. 4 From
(13), itfollows that a value-maximizing bank will increase
leverage indefinitely unless constrainedbyregulation. (14)
indicates that abankhas an incentiveto increaseassetrisk.
How the incentives for increasing asset risk, holding Co
constant, would be affectedbychanges inleverageinduced
by regulation can be determined by taking the partial
derivation of (14) with respect to the current value of
deposits. This yields the result:
a 2I
aera; I Co = o
... r:- , aI
+ Aov t F' (X) a(Do/A
o
) > O.
since [aAo/a(Do/Ao)) ~ O. Thus, whether or not is Co
constant, higher capital requirements reduce the marginal
gainsfrom increasingassetrisk. Thisinturnmeansthatthe
risk exposure ofthe deposit insurance system is lower.
As long as a bank has positive initial capital, this last
partial derivative will be positive because F"(X) < 0 and
ax/aDo < 0 andF'(X) > O. This result is qualitatively the
same as thatobtainedfrom the state-preference model. The
marginal gain from risk-taking increases with leverage,
holding capital constant. Therefore, higher capital stan-
dards by themselves would not increase the incentives for
insured banks to increase asset risk.
As in the state-preference model, this conclusion also
(16) =
VI. Conclusion
This note analyzes the theoretical relationships between
capital regulation and bank asset risk. The key finding is
thatregulatory increasesincapital standardsby themselves
will not require greaterefforts to restrain assetrisk. Higher
capital requirements reduce the incentives for a bank to
increase asset risk. Our results also indicate that a value-
maximizing bank prefers to meet higher required capital
ratios by raising additional capital, rather than merely by
selling assets and retiring deposits. In this way the bank
maximizes its volume ofassets and thereby the value ofthe
deposit insurance subsidy.
The implication is that regulatory efforts to raise capital
standards do not lead a value-maximizing bank to hold a
more risky asset portfolio, as long as regulators do not also
relax efforts to limit asset risk and size. Thus, a more
stringentcapitalregulation will reduce the riskexposureof
the deposit insurance system.
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1. In a New York Times article on March 5, 1987, con-
cerning a Federal Reserve proposal to require banks to
hold capital in connection with interest rate and currency
contracts, William McDonough, vice chairman of First Na-
tional Bank of Chicago, is quoted as saying that"... the
proposal could lead banks to take on riskier business to
compensate for the lower returns they would almost as-
suredly get by having to maintain more capita!."
In the academic literature, studies such as Kahane (1977)
and Koehn and Santomero (1980), applying a mean-
variance model to utility maximizing banks, conclude that
higher capital ratios can lead to greater asset risk. In a
recent article in this journal, Keeley and Furlong show that
the previous studies using such aframework are internally
inconsistent and the models cannot be used to support
the conclusion that a higher bank capital ratio can lead to
greater risk-taking.
2. Thus, Ao and Co exclude the value of any deposit
insurance subsidy, which will be introduced shortly.
3. The conclusions from the analysis would be un-
changed if the rate were a positive, fixed-rate premium.
4. See Jarrow and Rudd (1983).
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